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Is it possible for a large sequence of measurements or observations, which support a hypothesis,
to counterintuitively decrease our confidence? Can unanimous support be too good to be true? The
assumption of independence is often made in good faith, however rarely is consideration given to
whether a systemic failure has occurred.
Taking this into account can cause certainty in a hypothesis to decrease as the evidence for
it becomes apparently stronger. We perform a probabilistic Bayesian analysis of this effect with
examples based on (i) archaeological evidence, (ii) weighing of legal evidence, and (iii) cryptographic
primality testing.
We find that even with surprisingly low systemic failure rates high confidence is very difficult to
achieve and in particular we find that certain analyses of cryptographically-important numerical
tests are highly optimistic, underestimating their false-negative rate by as much as a factor of 280.
INTRODUCTION
In a number of branches of science, it is now well-
known that deleterious effects can conspire to produce
a benefit or desired positive outcome. A key example
where this manifests is in the field of stochastic reso-
nance [1–3] where a small amount of random noise can
surprisingly improve system performance, provided some
aspect of the system is nonlinear. Another celebrated
example is that of Parrondo’s Paradox where individu-
ally losing strategies combine to provide a winning out-
come [4, 5].
Loosely speaking, a small amount of ‘bad’ can produce
a ‘good’ outcome. But is the converse possible? Can too
much ‘good’ produce a ‘bad’ outcome? In other words,
can we have too much of a good thing?
The answer is affirmative—when improvements are
made that result in a worse overall outcome this situa-
tion is known as Verschlimmbesserung [6] or disimprove-
ment. Whilst this converse paradigm is less well known
in the literature, a key example is the Braess Paradox
where an attempt to improve traffic flow by adding by-
pass routes can counterintuitively result in worse traffic
congestion [7–9]. Another example is the truel, where
three gunmen fight to the death—it turns out that un-
der certain conditions the weakest gunman surprisingly
reduces his chances of survival by firing a shot at either
of his opponents [10]. These phenomena can be broadly
considered to fall under the class of anti-Parrondo ef-
fects [11, 12], where the inclusion of winning strategies
fail.
In this paper, for the first time, we perform a Bayesian
mathematical analysis to explore the question of multiple
confirmatory measurements or observations for showing
when they can—surprisingly—disimprove confidence in
the final outcome. We choose the striking example that
increasing confirmatory identifications in a police line-up
or identity parade can, under certain conditions, reduce
our confidence that a perpetrator has been correctly iden-
tified.
Imagine that as a court case drags on, witness after
witness is called. Let us suppose thirteen witnesses have
testified to having seen the defendant commit the crime.
Witnesses may be notoriously unreliable, but the sheer
magnitude of the testimony is apparently overwhelming.
Anyone can make a misidentification but intuition tells
us that, with each additional witness in agreement, the
chance of them all being incorrect will approach zero.
Thus one might na¨ıvely believe that the weight of as
many as thirteen unanimous confirmations leaves us be-
yond reasonable doubt.
However, this is not necessarily the case and more
confirmations can surprisingly disimprove our confidence
that the defendant has been correctly identified as the
perpetrator. This type of possibility was recognised in-
tuitively in ancient times. Under ancient Jewish law [13],
one could not be unanimously convicted of a capital
crime—it was held that the absence of even one dissent-
ing opinion among the judges indicated that there must
remain some form of undiscovered exculpatory evidence.
Such approaches are greatly at odds with standard
practice in engineering, where measurements are often
taken to be independent. When this is so, each new
measurement tends to lend support to the outcome with
which it most concords. An important question, then, is
to distinguish between the two types of decision problem;
those where additional measurements truly lend support,
and those for which increasingly consistent evidence ei-
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2ther fails to add or actively reduces confidence. Other-
wise, it is only later when the results come under scrutiny
that unexpectedly good results are questioned; Mendel’s
plant-breeding experiments provide a good example of
this [14, 15], his results matching their predicted values
sufficiently well that their authenticity has been mired in
controversy since the early 20th century.
The key ingredient is the presence of a hidden fail-
ure state that changes the measurement response. This
change may be a priori quite rare—in the applications
that we shall discuss, it ranges from 10−1 to 10−19—but
when several observations are aggregated, the a posteriori
probability of the failure state can increase substantially,
and even come to dominate the a posteriori estimate of
the measurement response. We shall show that by includ-
ing error rates, this changes the information-fusion rule
in a measurement dependent way. Simple linear super-
position no longer holds, resulting in non-monotonicity
that leads to these counterintuitive effects.
This paper is constructed as follows. First, we intro-
duce an example of a hypothetical archaeological find:
a clay pot from the Roman era. We consider multiple
confirmatory measurements that decide whether the pot
was made in Britain or Italy. Via a Bayesian analysis,
we then show that due to failure states, our confidence
in the pot’s origin does not improve for large numbers of
confirmatory measurements. We begin with this example
of the pot, due to its simplicity and that it captures the
essential features of the problem in a clear manner.
Second, we build on this initial analysis and extend
it to the problem of the police identity parade, showing
our confidence that a perpetrator has been identified sur-
prisingly declines as the number of unanimous witnesses
becomes large. We use this mathematical framework to
revisit a specific point of ancient Jewish law—we show
that it does indeed have a sound basis, even though it
grossly challenges our na¨ıve expectation.
Third, we finish with a final example to show that our
analysis has broader implications and can be applied to
electronic systems of interest to engineers. We chose the
example of a cryptographic system and that a surpris-
ingly small bit error rate can result in a larger-than-
expected reduction in security.
Our analyses ranging from cryptography to criminol-
ogy, provide examples of how rare failure modes can have
a counterintuitive effect on the achievable level of confi-
dence.
A HYPOTHETICAL ROMAN POT
Let us begin with a simple scenario, the identification
of the origin of a clay pot that has been dug from British
soil. Its design identifies it as being from the Roman era,
and all that remains is to determine whether it was made
in Roman-occupied Britain or whether it was brought
from Italy by travelling merchants. Suppose that we are
fortunate and that a test is available to distinguish be-
tween the clay from the two regions; clay from one area—
let us suppose that it is Britain—contains a trace element
which can be detected by laboratory tests with an error
rate pe = 0.3. This is clearly excessive, and so we run the
test several times. After k tests have been made on the
pot, the number of errors will be binomially-distributed
E ∼ Bin(k, pe). If the two origins, Britain and Italy, are
a priori equally likely, then the most probable origin is
the one suggested by the greatest number of samples.
Now imagine that several manufacturers of pottery de-
liberately introduced large quantities of this element dur-
ing their production process, and that therefore it will be
detected with 90% probability in their pots, which make
up pc = 1% of those found; of these, half are of British
origin. We call pc the contamination rate. This is the hid-
den failure state to which we alluded in the introduction.
Then, after the pot tests positive several times, we will
become increasingly certain that it was manufactured in
Britain. However, as more and more test results are re-
turned from the laboratory, all positive, it will become
more and more likely that the pot was manufactured with
this unusual process, eventually causing the probability
of British origin, given the evidence, to fall to 50%. This
is the essential paradox of the system with hidden fail-
ure states—overwhelming evidence can itself be evidence
of uncertainty, and thus be less convincing than more
ambiguous data.
Formal model
Let us now proceed to formalise the problem above.
Suppose we have two hypotheses, H0 and H1, and a se-
ries of measurements X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn). We define a
variable F ∈ N that determines the underlying measure-
ment distribution, pX|F,Hi(x). We may then use Bayes’
law to find
P [Hi|X] = P [X|Hi]P [Hi]
P [X]
, (1)
which can be expanded by condition with respect to F ,
yielding
=
∑
f
P [X|Hi, f ]P [Hi, F = f ]∑
f,Hk
P [X|Hk, f ]P [Hk, F = f ]
. (2)
In our examples there are a number of simplifying
conditions—there are only two hypotheses and two mea-
surement distributions, reducing Eqn. 2 to
3P [Hi|X] =
1 +
1∑
f=0
P [X|H1−i, F = f ] P [H1−i, F = f ]
1∑
f=0
P [X|Hi, F = f ] P [Hi, F = f ]

−1
. (3)
Computation of these a posteriori probabilities thus re-
quires knowledge of two distributions: the measure-
ment distributions P [X|Hk, F ], and the state probabili-
ties P [Hi, F ]. Having tabulated these, we may substitute
them into Eqn. 3, yielding the a posteriori probability for
each hypothesis. In this paper, the measurement distri-
butions P [X|Hi, F = f ] are all binomial, however this is
not the case in general.
Analysis of the pot origin distribution
In the case of the pot, the hypotheses and mea-
surement distributions—the origin and contamination,
respectively—are shown in Table I.
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TABLE I. The model parameters for the case of the pot for
use in Eqn. 3 with a contamination rate pc = 10
−2. The a
priori distribution of the origin is identically 50% for both
Britain and Italy, whether or not the pot’s manufacturing
process has contaminated the results. As a result, the two
columns of P [F,Hi] are identical. The columns of the mea-
surement distribution, shown right, differ from one another,
thereby giving the test discriminatory power. When the pot
has been contaminated, the probability of a positive result is
identical for both samples, rendering the test ineffective.
Each measurement is Bernoulli-distributed, and the
number of positive results is therefore described by a Bi-
nomial distribution, with the probability mass function
P [X = x] =
(
n
x
)
px(1− p)n−x
after N trials, the probability p being taken from the
measurement distribution section of Table I.
Substituting these probability masses into Eqn. 2, we
see in Figure 1 that as more and more tests return posi-
tive results, we become increasingly certain of its British
heritage, but an unreasonably large number of positive
results will indicate contamination and so yield a reduced
level of certainty.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Unanimously-positivegtests
P[
Br
iti
sh
go
rig
in
]
pcg=g10¯¹
10¯²
10¯³
pcg=g0
FIG. 1. Probability that the pot is of British origin given
n numbers of tests, all coming back positive, for a variety
of contamination rates pc and a 30% error rate. In the case
of the pot above, with pc = 10
−2, we see a peak at n = 5,
after which the level of certainty falls back to 0.5 as it becomes
more likely that the pot originates at a contaminating factory.
When pc = 0, this is the standard Bayesian analysis where
failure states are not considered. We see therefore that even
small contamination rates can have a large effect on the global
behaviour of the testing methodology.
It is worth taking a moment, however, to briefly discuss
the effects of weakening certain conditions; in particular,
we consider two cases: that where the rate of contamina-
tion depends upon the origin of the pot, and that where
the results after contamination are also origin-dependant.
Where the rate of contamination depends upon the
origin, evidence of contamination provides some small
evidence of where the pot came from. Thus if 80% of
contaminated pots are of British origin, then Figure 1
will eventually converge to 0.8 rather than 0.5.
If the probability of a positive test is dependent upon
the origin even when contaminated, then the behaviour
of the test protocol changes qualitatively. Supposing that
4in the contaminated case the test is substantially less ac-
curate, the probability of British origin will drop towards
0.5, as now, due to the increased likelihood of contami-
nation; eventually, however, it will rise again towards 1.0
as sufficient data becomes available to make use of the
less probative experiment that we now know to be taking
place.
THE RELIABILITY OF IDENTITY PARADES
We initially described the scenario of a court case, in
which witness after witness testifies to having seen the
defendant commit the crime of which he is accused. But
in-court identifications are considered unreliable, and in
reality if identity is in dispute then the identification is
made early in the investigation under controlled condi-
tions [16]. At some point, whether before or after being
charged, the suspect has most likely been shown to each
witness amongst a number of others, known as fillers, who
are not under suspicion. Each witness is asked to identify
the true perpetrator, if present, amongst the group.
This process, known as an identity parade or line-up, is
an experiment intended to determine whether the suspect
is in fact the same person as the perpetrator. It may be
performed only once, or repeated many times with many
witnesses. As human memory is inherently uncertain, the
process will include random error; if the experiment is not
properly carried out then there may also be systematic
error, and this is the problem that concerns us in this
paper.
Having seen how a unanimity of evidence can create
uncertainty in the case of the unidentified pot, we now
apply the same analysis to the case of an identity pa-
rade. If the perpetrator is not present—that is to say,
if the suspect is innocent—then in an unbiased parade
the witness should be unable to choose the suspect with
a probability greater than chance. Ideally, they would
decline to make a selection, however this does not always
occur in practice [16, 17], and forms part of the random
error of the procedure. If the parade is biased—whether
intentionally or unintentionally—for example because (i)
the suspect is somehow conspicuous [18], (ii) the staff
running the parade direct the witness towards him, (iii)
by chance he happens to resemble the perpetrator more
closely than the fillers, or (iv) because the witness holds
a bias, for example because they have previously seen
the suspect [16], then an innocent suspect may be se-
lected with a probability greater than chance. This is
the hidden failure state that underlies this example; we
assume in our analysis that this is completely binary—
either the parade is completely unbiased or it is highly
biased against the suspect.
In recent decades, a number of experiments [17, 19]
have been carried out in order to establish the reliability
of this process. Test subjects are shown the commission
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TABLE II. The model parameters for the hypothetical iden-
tity parade. In a similar fashion to the first example, we
assume a priori a 50% probability of guilt. In this case,
the measurement distributions are substantially assymmetric
with respect to innocence and guilt, unlike Table I.
of a simulated crime, whether in person or on video, and
asked to locate the perpetrator amongst a number of peo-
ple. In some cases the perpetrator will be present, and
in others not. The former allows estimation of the false-
negative rate of the process—the rate that the witness
fails to identify the perpetrator when present—and the
latter the false-positive rate—the rate at which an inno-
cent suspect will be mistakenly identified. Let us denote
by pfn the false-negative rate; this is equal to the pro-
portion of subjects who failed to correctly identify the
perpetrator when he was present, and was found in [17]
to be 48%.
Estimating the false positive rate is complicated by the
fact that only one suspect is present in the lineup—when
the suspect is innocent, an eyewitness who incorrectly
identifies a filler as being the perpetrator has correctly
rejected the innocent suspect as being the perpetrator,
despite their error. For the purposes of our analysis, we
assume that the witness selects at random in this case,
and therefore divide the 80% perpetrator-absent selection
rate of [17] by the number of participants L = 6, yielding
a false-positive rate of pfp = 0.133.
Let us now suppose that there is a small probability
pc that the line-up is conducted incorrectly—for example,
volunteers have been chosen who fail to adequately match
the description of the perpetrator—leading to identifica-
tion of the suspect 90% of the time, irrespective of his
guilt. For the sake of analysis we assume that if this
occurs, it will occur for all witnesses, though in prac-
tice the police might perform the procedure correctly for
some witnesses and not others. The probability of the
suspect being identified for each of the cases is shown in
Table II.
If we assume a 50% prior probability of guilt, and inde-
pendent witnesses, the problem is now identical to that
of identifying the pot. The probability of guilt, given
the unanimous parade results, is shown in Figure 2 as a
function of the number of unanimous witnesses.
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FIG. 2. Probability of guilt given varying numbers of unani-
mous line-up identifications, assuming a 50% prior probability
of guilt and identification accuracies given by [17]. Of note is
that for the case that we have plotted here where the witnesses
are unanimous, with a failure rate pc = 0.01 it is impossible
to reach 95% certainty in the guilt of the suspect, no matter
how many witnesses have been found.
We see that after a certain number of unanimously pos-
itive identifications the probability of guilt diminishes.
Even with only one in ten-thousand line-ups exhibiting
this bias towards the suspect, the peak probability of
guilt is reached with only five unanimous witnesses, com-
pletely counter to intuition—in fact, with this rate of
failure, ten identifications in agreement provide less evi-
dence of guilt than three. We see also that even with a
50% prior probability of guilt, a 1% failure rate renders it
impossible to achieve 95% certainty if the witnesses are
unanimous.
This tendency to be biased towards a particular mem-
ber of the lineup when an error occurs has been noted [16,
paragraph 4.31] prior to the more rigorous research stim-
ulated by the advent of DNA testing, leading us to sus-
pect that our sub-1% contamination rates are probably
overly optimistic.
ANCIENT JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
The acknowledgement of this type of phenomenon is
not entirely new; indeed, the adage ”too good to be true”
dates to the sixteenth century [20, good, P5.b]. More-
over, its influence on judicial procedure was visible in
Jewish law even in the classical era; until the Romans ul-
timately removed the right of the Sanhedrin to confer
death sentences, a defendant unanimously condemned
by the judges would be acquitted [13, Sanhedrin 18b],
the Talmud stating “If the Sanhedrin unanimously find
guilty, he is acquitted. Why? — Because we have learned
by tradition that sentence must be postponed till the
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TABLE III. The model parameters for the Sanhedrin trial.
Again, we assume an a priori 50% probability of guilt. How-
ever, the measurement distributions are the results of [21,
model (2)] for juries; in contrast to the case of the identity
parade, the false negative rate is far lower. Despite the trial
being conducted by judges, we choose to use the jury results,
as the judges tendancy towards conviction is not reflected in
the highly risk-averse rabbinic legal tradition.
morrow in hope of finding new points in favour of the
defence”.
The value of this rule becomes apparent when we con-
sider that the Sanhedrin was composed, for ordinary cap-
ital offenses, of 23 members [13, Sanhedrin 2a]. In our
line-up model, this many unanimous witnesses would in-
dicate a probability of guilt scarcely better than chance,
suggesting that the inclusion of this rule should have a
substantial effect.
We show the model parameters for the Sanhedrin de-
cision in Table III, which we use to compute the proba-
bility of guilt in Figure 3 for various numbers of judges
condemning the defendant. We see that the probabil-
ity of guilt falls as judges approach unanimity, however
excluding unanimous decisions substantially reduces the
probability of false conviction.
It is worth stressing that the exact shapes of the curves
in Figure 3 are unlikely to be entirely correct; commu-
nication between the judges will prevent their verdicts
from being entirely independent, and false-positive and
false-negative rates will be very much dependent upon
the evidentiary standard required to bring charges, the
strength of the contamination when it does occur, and
the accepted burden of proof of the day. However, it
is nonetheless of qualitative interest that with reason-
able parameters, this ancient law can be shown to have
a sound statistical basis.
THE RELIABILITY OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SYSTEMS
We now consider a different example, drawn from cryp-
tography. An important operation in many protocols is
the generation and verification of prime numbers; the se-
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FIG. 3. Probability of guilt as a function of judges in agree-
ment out of 23—the number used by the Sanhedrin for most
capital crimes—for various contamination rates pc. We as-
sume as before that half of defendants are guilty, and use
the estimated false-positive and false-negative rates of juries
from [21, model (2)], 0.14 and 0.25 respectively. We arbi-
trarily assume that a ‘contaminated’ trial will result in the a
positive vote 95% of the time. The panel of judges numbers
23, with conviction requiring a majority of two and at least
one dissenting opinion [13, Sanhedrin]; the majority of two
means that the agreement of at least 13 judges is required
in order to to cast a sentence of death, to a maximum of
22 votes in order to satisfy the requirement of a dissenting
opinion. These necessary conditions for a conviction by the
Sanhedrin are shown as the pink region in the graph.
curity of some protocols depends upon the primality of
a number that may be chosen by an adversary; in this
case, one may test whether it is a prime, whether by
brute-force or by using another test such as the Rabin-
Miller [22, p. 176] test. As the latter is probabilistic,
we repeat it until we have achieved the desired level
of security—in [22], a probability 2−128 of accepting a
composite as prime is considered acceptable. However, a
na¨ıve implementation cannot achieve this level of secu-
rity, as we will demonstrate.
The reason is that despite it being proven that each
iteration of the Rabin-Miller test will reject a composite
number with probability at least 0.75, a real computer
may fail at any time. The chance of this occurring is
small, however it turns out that the probability of a stray
cosmic ray flipping a bit in the machine code, causing the
test to accept composite numbers, is substantially greater
than 2−128.
Code changes caused by memory errors
Data provided by Google [23] suggests that a given
memory module has approximately an 8% probability of
suffering an error in any given year, independent of ca-
pacity. Assuming a 4 GB module, this results in approxi-
int trialdivision (long to test)
{
long i;
long threshold;
if ( to test % 2 == 0)
{
return 1;
}
threshold = (long)sqrt(to test );
for(i = 3; i <= threshold; i += 2)
{
if ( to test % i == 0)
{
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
FIG. 4. A function that tests for primality by attempting to
factorise its input by brute force.
mately a λ = 10−19 probability that any given bit will be
flipped in any given second. We will make the assump-
tion that, in the machine code for the primality-testing
routine, there exists at least one bit that, if flipped, will
cause all composite numbers—or some class of compos-
ite numbers known to the adversary—to be accepted as
prime. As an example of how this could happen, consider
the function shown in Figure 4 that implements a brute-
force factoring test. Assuming that the input is odd, the
function will reach one of two return statements, return-
ing zero or one. The C compiler GCC compiles these two
return statements to
45 0053 B8010000 movl $1 , %eax
45 00
46 0058 EB14 jmp .L3
and
56 0069 B8000000 movl $0 , %eax
56 00
respectively. That is to say, it stores the return value as
an immediate into the EAX register and then jumps to
the cleanup section of the function, labelled .L3. The
store instructions on lines 45 and 56 have machine-code
values B801000000 and B8000000000 for return values of
one and zero respectively. These differ by only one bit,
and therefore can be transformed into one another by a
single bit-error. If the first instruction is turned into the
second, this will cause the function to return zero for any
odd input, thus always indicating that the input is prime.
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TABLE IV. Model parameters for the Rabin-Miller test on
random 2000-bit numbers. However, we have no choice but to
assume the lower bound on the composite-number rejection
rate, and so this model is inappropriate. Furthermore, in
an adversarial setting the attacker may intentionally choose
a difficult-to-detect composite number, rendering the prior
distribution optimistic.
The effect of memory errors on confidence
At cryptographically-interesting sizes—on the order of
22000—roughly one in a thousand numbers is prime [22,
p. 173]. We might calculate the model parameters as
before—for interest’s sake, we have done so in Table IV—
and calculate the confidence in a number’s primality after
a given number of tests. However, this is not particularly
useful, for two reasons: first, the rejection probability of
75% is a lower bound, and for randomly chosen numbers
is a substantial underestimate; second, we do not always
choose numbers at random, but rather may need to test
those provided by an adversary. In this case, we must
assume that they have tried to deceive us by providing
a composite number, and would instead like to know the
probability that they will be successful. The Bayesian
estimator in this case would provide only a tautology of
the type: ‘given the data and the fact that the number
is composite, the number is composite’.
Let us suppose that the machine containing the code
is rebooted every month, and the Rabin-Miller code re-
mains in memory for the duration of this period; then, ne-
glecting other potential errors that could affect the test,
at the time of the reboot the probability that the bit
has flipped is now pf = 2.6 × 10−13; this event we de-
note AF . Let k be the number of iterations performed;
the probability of accepting a composite number is at
most 4−k, and we assume that the adversary has chosen
a composite number such that this is the true probabil-
ity of acceptance. We denote the event that the prime is
accepted by the correctly-operating algorithm AR.
When hardware errors are taken into account, the
probability of accepting a composite number is no longer
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FIG. 5. The acceptance rate as a function of time in memory
and the number of Rabin-Miller iterations under the single-
error fault model described in this paper. An acceptance rate
of 2−128 is normally chosen, however without error correction
this cannot be achieved. The false-acceptance rate after k
iterations is given by pfa[k] = 4
−k(1 − pf ) + pf , where pf is
the probability that a fault has occurred that causes a false
acceptance 100% of the time. We estimate pf to be equal
to 10−19T , where T is the length of time in seconds that the
code has been in memory.
4−k, but
pfa = P [AF ∪AR] (4)
= P [AF ] + P [AR]− P [AF , AR]. (5)
Since AF and AR are independent,
= P [AF ] + P [AR]− P [AF ]P [AR] (6)
= 4−k(1− pf ) + pf (7)
≥ pf . (8)
No matter how many iterations k of the algorithm are
performed, this is substantially greater than the 2−128
security level that is predicted by probabilistic analysis of
the algorithm alone, thus demonstrating that algorithmic
analyses that do not take into account the reliability of
the underlying hardware can be highly optimistic. The
false acceptance rate as a function of the number of test
iterations and time in memory is shown in Figure 5.
A real cryptographic system will include many such
checks in order to make sure that an attacker has not
chosen weak values for various parameters, and a failure
of any of these may result in the system being broken, so
our calculations are somewhat optimistic.
Error-correcting-code equipped (ECC) memory will
substantially reduce the risk of this type of fault, and
for regularly-accessed regions of code—multiple times per
second—will approach the 2−128 level. A single parity
bit, as used in at least some CPU level-one instruction
8caches [24], requires two bit-flips to induce an error. Sup-
pose the parity is checked every R seconds, then the prob-
ability of an undetected bit-flip in any given second is
λ′ =
(λR)2
R
= λ2R. (9)
For code that is accessed even moderately often, this will
come much closer to 2−128. For example, if R = 100 ms
then this results in a false-acceptance rate of 2−108 af-
ter one month, much closer to the 2−128 level of secu-
rity promised by analysis of the algorithm alone. The
stronger error-correction codes used by the higher-level
caches and main memory will detect virtually all such
errors—with two-bit detection capability, the rate of un-
detected bit-flips will be at most
λ′ = λ3R2, (10)
and even with check rate of only once per 100 ms, the
rate of memory errors is essentially zero, increasing the
false-acceptance rate by a factor of only 10−14 above the
2−128 level that would be achieved in a perfect operating
environment.
DISCUSSION
This phenomenon is interesting in that it is commonly
known and applied heuristically, and trivial examples
such as the estimation of coin bias [25, section 2.1]
have been well-analysed—see the appendix for a brief
discussion—but these rare failure states are rarely, if
ever, considered when a statistical approach to decision-
making is applied to an entire system. Real systems that
attempt to counter failure modes producing consistent
data tend to focus upon the detection of particular fail-
ures rather than the mere fact of consistency. Sometimes
there is little choice—a casino that consistently ejected
gamblers on a winning streak would soon find itself with-
out a clientelle—however we have demonstrated that in
many cases the level of consistency needed to cast doubt
on the validity of the data is surprisingly low.
If this is so, then we must reconsider the use of thresh-
olding as a decision mechanism when there is the poten-
tial for such failure modes to exist, particularly when the
consequences of an incorrect decision are large. When the
decision rule takes the form of a probability threshold, it
is necessary to deduce an upper threshold as well, such
as was shown in Figure 3, in order to avoid capturing the
region indicative of a systemic failure.
That this phenomenon was accounted for in ancient
Jewish legal practice indicates a surprising level of in-
tuitive statistical sophistication in this ancient law code;
though predating by millennia the statistical tools needed
to perform a rigorous analysis, our simple model of the
judicial panel indicates that the requirement of a dissent-
ing opinion would have provided a substantial increase in
the probability of guilt required to secure a conviction.
Applied to cryptographic systems, we see that even
the minuscule probability that one particular bit in the
system’s machine code will be flipped due to a memory
error over the course of a month, rendering the system
insecure, is approximately 280 times larger than the risk
predicted by algorithmic analysis. This demonstrates the
importance of strong error correction in modern crypto-
graphic systems that strive for a failure rate on the order
of 2−128, a level of certainty that appears to be otherwise
unachievable without active mitigation of the effect.
The use of naturally-occuring memory errors for DNS
hijacking [26] has previously been demonstrated, and the
ability of a user to disturb protected addresses by writing
to adjacent cells [27] has been demonstrated, however
little consideration has been given to the possibility that
this type of fault might occur simply by chance, implying
that security analyses which assume reliable hardware are
substantially flawed when applied to consumer systems
lacking error-corrected memory.
We have considered only a relatively simple case, in
which there are only two levels of contamination. How-
ever, in practical situations we might expect any of a wide
range of failure modes varying continuously. We have de-
scribed a simple case in the appendix, where a coin may
be biased—or not—towards either heads or tails with any
strength; were one to apply this to the case of an iden-
tity parade, for example, one would find a probability
that the suspect is indeed the perpetrator, as before, but
taking into account that there may well be slight biases
that nudge the witnesses towards or away from the sus-
pect, not merely catastrophic ones. The result is heavily
dependent upon the distribution of the bias, and lacking
sufficient data to produce such a model we have chosen
to eschew the complexity of the continuous approach and
focus on a simple two-level model. An example of this
approach is shown in [28, p. 117].
A related concept to that which we have discussed
is the Duhem-Quine hypothesis [28, p. 6]; this is the
idea that an experiment inherently tests hypotheses as
a group—not merely the phenomenon that we wish to
examine, but also the correct function of the experimen-
tal apparatus for example, and that that only the desired
independent variables are being changed. Our thesis is a
related one, namely that in practical systems the failure
of these auxiliary hypotheses, though unlikely, result in
a significant reduction in confidence when it occurs, an
effect which has traditionally been ignored.
CONCLUSION
We have analysed the behaviour of systems that are
subject to systematic failure, and demonstrated that with
9relatively low failure rates, large sample sizes are not re-
quired in order that unanimous results start to become
indicative of systematic failure. We have investigated
the effect of this phenomenon upon identity parades, and
shown that even with only a 1% rate of failure, confidence
begins to decrease after only three unanimous identifica-
tions, failing to reach even 95%.
We have also applied our analysis of the phenomenon
to cryptographic systems, investigating the effect by
which confidence in the security of a parameter fails to
increase with further testing due to potential failures of
the underlying hardware. Even with a minuscule failure
rate of 10−13 per month, this effect dominates the anal-
ysis and is thus a significant determining factor in the
overall level of security, increasing the probability that a
maliciously-chosen parameter will be accepted by a factor
of more than 280.
Hidden failure states such as these reduce confidence
far more than intuition leads one to believe, and must be
more carefully considered than is the case today if the
lofty targets that we set for ourselves are to be achieved
in practice.
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Analysis of a biased coin
It is worth adding a brief discussion of a simple and
well-known problem that has some relation to what we
have discussed, namely the question of whether or not a
coin is biased. We follow the Bayesian approach given
in [25].
They use Bayes’ law in its proportional form,
P [Q|{data}] ∝ P [{data}|Q]P [Q], (11)
where Q is the probability that a coin-toss will yield
heads. Various prior distributions Q[H] can be chosen, a
matter that we will discuss momentarily.
As the coin tosses are independent, the data can
be boiled down to a binomial random variable X ∼
Bin(p, n), where n is the number of coin tosses made.
Substituting the binomial probability mass function into
Eqn. 11, they find that
P [Q|X] ∝ QX(1−Q)n−XP [Q]. (12)
As the number of samples n increases, this becomes in-
creasingly peaked around the value Q = X/n, this ‘peak-
ing’ effect limited by the shape of P [Q]. As the number
of samples increases, the QX(1−Q)n−X part of the ex-
pression eventually comes to dominate the shape of the
posterior distribution P [Q|X], and we have no choice but
to believe that the coin genuinely does have a bias close
to X/n.
In the examples previously discussed, we have assumed
that bias is very unlikely; in the coin example, this cor-
responds to a prior distribution P [Q] that is strongly
clustered around Q = 0.5; in this case, a very large num-
ber of samples will be necessary in order to conclusively
reject the hypothesis that the coin is unbiased or nearly
so. However, eventually this will occur, and the poste-
rior distribution will change; when this occurs, the sys-
tem has visibly failed—a casino using the coin will decide
that they are not in fact playing the game that they had
planned, and must cease before their loss becomes catas-
trophic. This is much like in the case of the Sanhedrin—if
too many judges agree, the system has failed, and should
not be considered reliable.
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